Congestion charging in Budapest - a comparison with existing systems by Szendrő, Gábor
Ŕ periodica polytechnica
Transportation Engineering
39/2 (2011) 99–103
doi: 10.3311/pp.tr.2011-2.09
web: http://www.pp.bme.hu/ tr
c© Periodica Polytechnica 2011
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Congestion charging in Budapest – a
comparison with existing systems
Gábor Szendro˝
Received 2010-09-06
Abstract
Transport is undoubtedly an extremely important sector in
Europe. Accounting for 10% of GDP, as well as 10 million
workers, it is also a major source of pollution and noise emis-
sions. The adverse effects of transport are amplified by con-
gestion, resulting in traffic jams, aggravation for motorists and
even more pollution. A number of different measures have been
devised to address this problem, and to spare populated city cen-
ters from heavy traffic loads, while also promoting the “polluter
pays principle”. One of these measures is congestion charging,
already implemented in several cities across Europe and world-
wide, and may soon be introduced in Budapest. The purpose
of this paper is to find a common ground for the schemes intro-
duced in London and Stockholm, comparing them to the possible
scheme in Budapest.
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1 Introduction
Opinions are extremely divided in the judgment of this policy.
The trade of transport claims that congestion charging serves
traffic calming and environmental protection as a priority, finan-
cial benefit only comes second. So far, only a few cities have in-
troduced some form of congestion charging, such as Singapore,
Oslo, London and Stockholm. Gothenburg is also in the pro-
cess of introduction, building heavily on the Stockholm exam-
ple. Congestion charging influences vehicle usage by protecting
a certain area from heavy traffic loads through a charge that must
be paid upon entering the zone. Exemptions and reductions usu-
ally apply (ex. for medical or military vehicles, local residents).
Even though most motorists complied with regulations, the
introduction of congestion charging led to an increase in spe-
cific crimes. In London, the number of vehicles carrying false
number plates has increased significantly. According to estima-
tions, the plates of 1 out of every 250 vehicles entering the zone
were false (40 000 license plates were stolen in 2006 alone) [1].
The effect of congestion charging on businesses within the zone
is controversial. Some businesses may report a loss in sales,
while increased delivery costs are also an issue [2]. The former
may drive an extension of opening hours to include weekends
or holidays (when the charge does not apply). Since the charge
affects different social strata to a different extent, the overall ef-
fect on business is likely neutral with large variations between
shops. This may result in some businesses relocating outside the
zone after the introduction of non-flat rate schemes.
Even though the primary goal of the charge is to reduce con-
gestion (environmental aspects, concerns or targets were not
listed among the reasons for introducing congestion charging in
London, for example), environmental benefits are also realized
through the net reduction in traffic volumes and the changes in
modal split. Greenhouse gases, nitrous oxide and particulates
can all be expected to decrease upon introducing charging, al-
though whether sustained benefits can be achieved (as opposed
to a one-off result at the time of introduction) is still a matter of
debate, and studies are currently being undertaken to investigate
this matter. Initial public resistance is likely to diminish after
the first few months of introduction as positive effects are start-
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ing to materialize [3]. This can be observed in both the Lon-
don and Stockholm cases, where public acceptance increased
rapidly after introduction. As new austerity programs are being
announced all over Europe, acceptance levels are likely consid-
erably lower compared to pre-crisis levels.
2 Short summary of the system in London
The London scheme, introduced by TfL in 2003, is an ANPR
(Automatic Number Plate Recognition) controlled, flat-rate sys-
tem (daily charge: £8 e9 covering 21 km2 in central London
[4, 10]. Exemptions apply (residents of the zone are automati-
cally eligible for 90% discount, public transport vehicles are au-
tomatically exempt – buses with at least 10 seats as well as taxis
– motorbikes and bicycles also). The net proceeds of the scheme
are to be used for “relevant transport purposes” by TfL, the
Greater London Authority (GLA), or a London borough council.
There are a wide variety of options available for arrang-
ing payment. Daily, weekly, monthly or annual passes can be
bought over the phone, the Internet, certain retail outlets, by post
or text messages. There is no discount for prepayment.
3 Short summary of the system in Stockholm
Unlike the London scheme, the Stockholm congestion charg-
ing system is not a uniform entrance fee. Instead, it is differ-
entiated by time and follows peak demand periods. Also, the
congestion charge must be paid every time upon entering the
zone, to a maximum of 60 SEK (∼e6) [5]. The amount paid is
deductible from the taxes of both businesses and individuals.
There are geographic and vehicle-based exemptions. Geo-
graphic exemptions apply when there is no viable alternative
route (such as the island of Lidingö, which has its only con-
nection to the mainland through the congestion charging zone).
Emergency vehicles, buses (weight min. 14 t), diplomatic corps
and military vehicles, motorcycles, vehicles registered in a for-
eign country, cars running on alternative fuels are automatically
exempt (this last condition applies until July 3 2012). It should
be noted that foreign vehicles are exempt because the Swedish
system treats its measure as a tax, which by definition can not
apply to foreigners. The same ANPR enforcement is used with
the option to install a DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Com-
munication) transponder. Contrary to the London scheme, the
charges are summarized in a bill (“tax decision”) which is sent
to the vehicle’s owner on a monthly basis and can also be viewed
on the web page of the Swedish Road Administration by logging
in [11].
4 The prospective scheme in Budapest
It must be emphasized that this congestion charging scheme
is still a work in progress and there are few details available.
It is reasonable to argue that charging should not be introduced
until the public transport system is capable of handling the in-
creased patronage due to the expected (favorable) changes in
modal split. In practice, this means postponing introduction un-
til at least Metro line 4 is completed and operational. As of writ-
ing this paper, Budapest Transport Plc. has annulled its contract
with subway car manufacturer Alstom.
The scheme presented herein represents the most likely sce-
nario, as published in a preliminary study by Városkutatás Ltd.
[6]. It involves a system much like in London, an area access fee
that must be paid daily, with no regard to the number of entries
made. The fee is defined as 2.75 times the cost of a single ticket
(800 HUF, e2.75), which helps in perpetually updating the sys-
tem in order to prevent the charge from being irrelevant or too
high.
Enforcement would use ANPR technology (around 300
planned gantries with cameras), with the option to install a
DSRC unit. The charging zone can be seen on Fig. 1
Source: [6]
Fig. 1. Planned charging zone in Budapest.
The charging zone covers downtown Budapest, bounded on
the Pest side by the Hungária circuit. The charge-free transit
route is marked in black (the Lower Quay on the Buda side).
Having such a large area will require numerous gantries to mon-
itor all possible entry points. The charge is flat rate, and does not
follow peak demand periods [6]. Exceptions will likely be kept
at the absolute minimum (public transport, taxis, law enforce-
ment, ambulances, motorbikes, etc.), since the expected com-
pliance rate is lower than in London or Stockholm, as demon-
strated by the frauds and evasion techniques (such as unautho-
rized use of disability cards) used by motorists to avoid park-
ing fees. Local residents will likely also have to pay, although
the discount they will receive is as yet unclear (multipliers be-
tween 0.5 and 0.25 could work well, fraud and evasion screening
will be problematic). The proposed scenario does not include
multiple zones, even though the area covered is large enough to
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Tab. 1. Cost and revenues of the systems.
Aspect London Stockholm Budapest(planned)
Charge area (km2) 21 30 ∼ 50
Area percentage (%) 1.32 7.9 9.5
Charge amount (e) 9 1-2 2.75
Planning and research costs (million e) 7.3 18 –
Annual revenues (million e) 236 91 147
Supporting PT upon introduction Yes Yes Deemed unnecessary
Source: own compilation, based on [8]
cover parts of Budapest (Zugló) that would merit a lower charge.
The exemption of vehicles carrying foreign license plates is still
an open question, enforcement will be difficult in light of the
(successful) evasion techniques with such vehicles in the case of
parking fees, speeding tickets and other fines, although the Eu-
ropean Debt Collection Agency could provide an alternative, as
was the case in London. For the purposes of this paper, foreign-
registered vehicles are considered as exempt. The scheme can
only be successful if the proceeds are earmarked for transport
improvement purposes. As the Városkutatás study notes, one
possible solution would be to set up a Transport Development
Fund to manage the revenues generated [7].
5 Comparison of the different systems
Apart from its role in reducing congestion, charging is also a
tool for internalizing other external costs resulting from trans-
port (such as pollution). In this regard, flat-rate schemes are not
as efficient. In an ideal situation, the charge that must be paid
would be differentiated by the time of day, route taken and en-
vironmental class. It should be noted, however, that such an ap-
proach would require greater effort in monitoring the movement
of vehicles. It would also result in greater complexity regard-
ing the calculation of the charge. These effects would require
substantially increased administration costs. Congestion tends
to be less heterogeneous in peak hours, so the flat-rate charging,
while not perfect, is not a bad approximation.
The funds required to set up the system and the revenues gen-
erated must also not be ignored. A comparative table of the
different schemes can be found in Table ??.
It is clear that the Budapest zone is much larger compared
to the other schemes. It should be noted that the increased pa-
tronage on public transport systems usually requires increased
initial financial support (with a 10% foreseen change in modal
split, this is both a quality and a quantity problem), an aspect
the Budapest scheme seems to be lacking. Since the system in
Budapest has not been introduced yet, its planning and research
costs can not be determined. It is likely that more research and
planning will be necessary if a well thought-out system is to be
introduced [9].
The amount to be paid is also debatable and should be pe-
riodically reviewed to perpetually adapt the system. As prices
and incomes rise, the amount to be paid, regardless of its initial
value, will become less significant, and therefore the effects of
the charge will diminish. If public transport demand or conges-
tion just outside the charging zone increase dramatically, then
the charge may be too high. If congestion is not substantially
affected, then the charge is too low.
As a common ground for further comparison of the schemes,
the Smeed Report seems a suitable starting point. Published in
1964, it suggested that drivers pay for the costs they imposed
on each other. It also set out the design criteria for road pricing
schemes which are still valid today [9]:
1 Charges should be closely related to the amount of use made
of the roads
2 It should be possible to vary prices for different areas, times
of day, week or year and classes of vehicle
3 Prices should be stable and readily ascertainable by road users
before they embark upon a journey
4 Payment in advance should be possible although credit facil-
ities may also be permissible
5 The incidence of the system upon individual road users should
be accepted as fair
6 The method should be simple for road users to understand
7 Any equipment should possess a high degree of reliability
8 It should be reasonably free from the possibility of fraud and
evasion, both deliberate and unintentional
9 It should be capable of being applied, if necessary, to the
whole country and to a vehicle population expected to rise
to over 30 million.
It should be noted that these criteria are meant to apply for
those eligible for payment (exemptions should not be considered
here). The original Smeed criteria have since been expanded to
contain 12 aspects (see Table 2).
The following table compares the charging schemes against
the extended Smeed criteria:
Usage
Charges should be a function of road usage. Neither scheme
complies with this criterion, as the London and Budapest
schemes are flat-rate, and the Stockholm system is only varied
by time of day.
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Tab. 2. Comparison based on the extended Smeed Criteria
Smeed Criteria London Stockholm Budapest
Usage No No No
Price variation No Yes No
Perfect Information Yes Yes Yes
Payment Yes Yes Yes
Fair No No No
Simple Yes Yes Yes
Reliable Yes Yes Yes
Enforceable Yes Yes Yes
Expandable Yes Yes Yes
Foreigners Yes No No
Privacy Yes Yes Yes
Technology Integration No No No
(Source: own compilation)
Price variation
Prices should be varied by area, vehicle type and time of day
to better reflect social costs. As discussed above, the Stockholm
scheme partly complies with this requirement by being time-
sensitive. Differentiation by environmental class and possibly
by zones in Budapest is being discussed, but is not included in
the proposed version to maintain simplicity (possibly creating a
system that is less fair).
Perfect information
All road users should have the necessary information about
pricing and how to pay before embarking on a journey. Both
existing systems are, and the Budapest scheme is proposed to
be in compliance with this requirement as information about the
charging schemes is (will be made) readily available through a
variety of channels.
Payment
Payment should be possible in advance and using several
methods. Both existing systems fulfil this requirement. The
Budapest payment system will likely include a mixture of elec-
tronic and on-site payment options.
Fair
The idea here is to impose higher charges on drivers with
higher income. No scheme meets this criterion (differentiation
by environmental class could actually have an opposite effect),
although it is a valid point to argue that congestion charges
cannot be unfair, since car owners usually have higher income.
Also, since the proceeds from the schemes are used for transport
investments, it can be stated that by paying the charge, derivers
are financing improvements to the transport system that are of
benefit to all.
Simple
All systems are quite simple and straightforward, easy to un-
derstand.
Reliable
As all systems share the same Automatic Number Plate
Recognition system, they are all very reliable (∼90% accu-
racy). The initial problems (false number plates) in London have
mostly been resolved, it is likely that the Budapest scheme will
follow a similar pattern with a higher number of non-compliant
drivers using foreign license plates.
Enforceable
All systems use a sophisticated system of photographs and
number plates with special software to enforce payment, and
they therefore meet this Smeed criterion. Evasion techniques
(false or foreign license plates, etc.) can eventually be overcome
(see above).
Expandable
All systems are based on a rugged framework that makes
them expandable, thereby meeting this criterion, although the
currently outlined plan for Budapest is unlikely to be expanded
in the near future.
Foreigners
The London scheme allows anyone to easily pay the conges-
tion charge if they are willing. Vehicles registered in the UK are
easily identified, vehicles registered in other countries may be
tracked down through a European Debt Collection Agency (al-
though this process may be tedious and unsuccessful). There-
fore, the London scheme complies with this criterion, as op-
posed to the Stockholm scheme, where foreign-registered vehi-
cles are automatically exempt. The Budapest system will likely
adopt a similar approach, as the enforcement of other regulations
have already proved problematic for foreign-registered vehicles
(Slovakia is especially popular).
Privacy
Both existing schemes respect the drivers’ privacy, as images
taken are automatically deleted from the system if the charge
has been paid, and is only retained for enforcement purposes as
evidence. It is expected that the Budapest scheme will follow
suit.
Technology integration
The London scheme is quite basic (cameras and number plate
recognition). Integration in this case would mean that the con-
gestion charge could be paid with the same smart card, web
page, etc. for different cities. The Stockholm system includes
a DSRC transponder which, in theory, could serve integration,
but it is an option only and is installed in a minority of vehicles.
The same will likely be true for the Budapest system, although
it can be argued that it is yet too early to consider integration.
Consequently, none of the systems comply.
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6 Final thoughts
The London and Stockholm systems have been very effec-
tive and are considered to be successful both by their respec-
tive administrators and the general public. Initial low public ac-
ceptance has improved much in both cases after introduction,
and solid results have been achieved. Therefore, both solutions
should be considered as leading examples to other European
cities that are contemplating the introduction of a congestion
charging scheme.
As we have seen, most of the extended Smeed criteria are
met by the London and Stockholm schemes (both fail 4), while
Budapest fails 5, although these results should be taken with
a grain of salt considering that the system is still under devel-
opment. Perhaps the greatest challenge is the necessity of per-
petual adaptation in order for the charge to remain fair and fi-
nancially relevant. The Budapest plan is quite advanced in this
respect, defining the charge as a function of the price of a single
ticket.
The London and Stockholm systems are among the pioneers
of congestion charging; hopefully Budapest will soon follow in
their footsteps so that the effects of ever-increasing mobility de-
mands, congestion, and pollution may be increasingly addressed
in Europe and around the world.
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